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ABSTRACT With the advent of deep sequencing, genomic surveillance has become a popular method for detection of infectious
disease, supplementing information gathered by classic clinical or serological techniques to identify host-determinant markers
and trace the origin of transmission. However, twomain factors complicate genomic surveillance. First, pathogens exhibiting
high genetic diversity demand higher levels of scrutiny to obtain an accurate representation of the entire population. Second,
current systems of detection are nonuniform, with significant gaps in certain geographic locations and animal reservoirs. De-
spite past unforeseen pandemics like the 2009 swine-origin H1N1 influenza virus, there is no standardized way of evaluating sur-
veillance. Amore complete surveillance system should capture a greater proportion of pathogen diversity. Here we present a
novel quantitative method of assessing the completeness of genomic surveillance that incorporates the time of sequence collec-
tion, as well as the pathogen’s evolutionary rate. We propose the q2 coefficient, which measures the proportion of sequenced
isolates whose closest neighbor in the past is within a genetic distance equivalent to 2 years of evolution, roughly the median
time of changing strain selection for influenza A vaccines. Easily interpretable and significantly faster than other methods, the q2
coefficient requires no full phylogenetic characterization or use of arbitrary clade definitions. Application of the q2 coefficient to
influenza A virus confirmed poor sampling of swine and avian populations and identified regions with deficient surveillance. We
demonstrate that the q2 coefficient can not only be applied to other pathogens, including dengue andWest Nile viruses, but also
used to describe surveillance dynamics, particularly the effects of different public health policies.
IMPORTANCE Surveillance programs have become key assets in determining the emergence or prevalence of pathogens circulat-
ing in human and animal populations. Genomic surveillance, in particular, provides comprehensive information on the history
of isolates and potential molecular markers for infectivity and pathogenicity. Current techniques for evaluating genomic surveil-
lance are inaccurate, ignoring the pathogen’s evolutionary rate and biodiversity, as well as the timing of sequence collection. Us-
ing sequence data, we propose the q2 coefficient as a quantitative measure of surveillance completeness that combines elements
of time and evolution without defining arbitrary criteria for clades or species. Through several case studies of influenza A, den-
gue, andWest Nile viruses, we employed the q2 coefficient to identify sampling deficiencies in different host species and loca-
tions, as well as examine the effects of different public health policies through historical records of the q2 coefficient. These re-
sults can guide public health agencies to focus resource allocation and virus collection to bolster specific problems in
surveillance.
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Despite many therapeutic and epidemiological advances, in-fectious diseases—the number one cause of death among
children—remain directly responsible for roughly 15 million
(25%) of the annual deaths that occur worldwide (1). Of partic-
ular concern are emerging infections (EIs) that include novel en-
tities like HIV/AIDS and severe acute respiratory syndrome and
previously existing but rapidly spreading diseases like cholera and
the plague (2, 3). Zoonosis is a rich source of such EI transmission
into human hosts (4), suggesting that pathogen surveillance of
animals, as well as humans, is an important method of early de-
tection of potential outbreaks and of capturing the entire biodi-
versity of a pathogen population at any given place and time.
Clinical, serologic, and genomic surveillance systems serve as
invaluable tools for detecting early outbreaks, determining the
genetic variation of a population, improving vaccine design, and
evading antibiotic resistance. In the case of influenza A virus, co-
ordinated global efforts like those of the World Health Organiza-
tion (WHO) identify cases of influenza-like symptoms, conduct
serology studies, and sequence viral isolates (5). Despite such ef-
forts, there remain areas of sparse data, particularly in potential
tropical influenza hot spots like India, Africa, or South America.
Such sampling bias in strain selection can skew the predicted
dominant virus used in annual vaccine design (6, 7).
Similarly, influenza virus surveillance has historically centered
on human influenza cases but ignored animal hosts, despite the
importance of zoonosis in influenza virus transmission. One par-
ticular animal host that deserves special attention is poultry,
which has played a crucial role in the transmission of highly
pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) virus H5N1 to humans. First
reported in Hong Kong in 1997 and 2003, this virus has spread
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quickly from waterfowl to chickens, crows, pigeons, and other
birds in Europe, Africa, and particularly Asia, leading to the deaths
by infection and forced culling of millions of birds and resulting in
appreciable economic losses (8). Concurrently, sporadic infec-
tions among humans and other mammals have claimed, as of
January 2012, a high rate of 340 deaths out of 578 confirmed
human infections since 2003 (9).
At present, no human-to-human transmission of HPAI virus
has been documented. However, scientists have recently discov-
ered the set of mutations that enable the transmission of avian
influenza virus between ferrets (10), the animal model most
closely mimicking human pathogenesis because of shared host
cellular receptors for viral attachment (11). These developments,
combined with the virus’s atypically high rate of mortality and
apparent resistance to oseltamavir (12), have raised worldwide
concerns about whether our current avian influenza virus surveil-
lance is sufficient to identify wild strains that have the potential for
mammalian adaptation.
The swine is another animal that demands adequate surveil-
lance (13). Researchers have observed that epithelial cells in the
pig trachea contain sialyloligosaccharides SA2,3 and SA2,6,
which are unique host determinants for birds and humans, re-
spectively (14). This feature confers tropism in pigs on both avian
and human influenza viruses (15), allowing swine to serve as mix-
ing vessels for antigenic shift, in which different strains infecting
the same host can reassort RNA segments to create a novel viral
strain (16). Such reassortments have engendered at least two ma-
jor human pandemics in the 20th century, in 1957 and 1968 (17).
The most recent pandemic of swine origin influenza virus (SOIV)
in 2009, in particular, was a reassortant between Eurasian and
North American swine lineages, and although the virus most likely
came from a pig, a definitive geographic origin has yet to be de-
termined (13, 18). Interestingly, the closest ancestors of the 2009
pandemic virus were related to viruses isolated from swine more
than a decade prior (13, 19), suggesting that relevant strains cir-
culating in swine herds have escaped detection because of inade-
quate sampling (18).
In response to the dearth of avian and swine influenza virus
isolates, invaluable programs like the Global Initiative on Sharing
Avian Influenza Data (GISAID) and the PREDICT program spon-
sored by the U.S. Agency for International Development Emerg-
ing Pandemic Threats were established to focus the monitoring of
circulating strains on wildlife, as well as to collect and make public
clinical, epidemiological, and molecular data on influenza virus
(20, 21). Despite such initiatives, many countries with the greatest
number of poultry or pig stocks do not proportionately contribute
avian and swine influenza virus sequences to public repositories
(7).
Currently, there is no standard quantitative measurement of
the appropriate level of genomic surveillance of a given pathogen.
One immediate approach might be to consider the absolute num-
ber of sequenced isolates, but this method fails to account for the
diversity and time information of the population sampled. A com-
paratively large number of sequences may be insufficient to cap-
ture high genetic diversity in a pathogen population. Another pos-
sible strategy appeals to clustering techniques. After representing
sequences as points in a mutational landscape, a highly clustered
structure could potentially reflect highly biased sampling. Once
again, this method ignores time and can be confounded by evolu-
tionary processes like bottlenecks. A final tactic might be to mea-
sure the genetic diversity within a sample of the pathogen. Phylo-
genetic reconstruction and tallying of species richness is one
method that characterized the subclades of avian H5N1 (8), but
such analyses are cumbersome, with arbitrary boundaries for clas-
sifying clades. Techniques more grounded in information theory
include Shannon’s entropy and Rao’s quadratic entropy (22), but
high diversity in a sample does not necessarily correlate with high
surveillance either.
In this paper, we propose a readily interpretable and comput-
able quantitative measurement for genomic surveillance of a
pathogen that directly accounts for the number of isolates, the
evolutionary rate, and the time of sample collection without the
need to define arbitrary clades or species or the need for a full
phylogenetic reconstruction. This measure ranks a surveillance
system as more complete if it is able to capture a greater propor-
tion of the pathogen’s diversity. We apply this measure to influ-
enza virus and compare the surveillance of different influenza
virus strains in different hosts and geographic regions. We find
that, compared to human seasonal strains, sampling is indeed sub-
stantially lower for swine H1N1 and avian non-H5N1 influenza
virus, historically overlooked strains despite their pandemic po-
tential. We also find that avian H5N1 influenza virus surveillance
in the WHO transmission zones of northern and western Africa;
eastern, southern, and southeastern Asia; and eastern, southwest-
ern, and northern Europe is high and may potentially serve as an
effective early warning system given a list of genetic determinants
of mammalian adaptation. Avian H5N1 influenza virus surveil-
lance in North America, however, is much less comprehensive.
We similarly apply our methodology to other RNA viruses and
show inadequate surveillance of both dengue and West Nile vi-
ruses. Finally, we perform a comparative analysis of the q2 coeffi-
cient and other methods, particularly phylogenetic and clustering
alternatives, and find that the q2 coefficient produces similar re-
sults with negligible computation time.
RESULTS
Measurement of surveillance: the q2 coefficient. We propose a
quantitative measure of pathogen surveillance that reflects both
the evolutionary rate and the biodiversity of a given population.
For each host and subtype, sequences were first temporally or-
dered from the oldest sequence to the newest. For each sequence,
we identified the sequence from the past with the highest homol-
ogy and recorded its genetic distance, such that for N sequences,
we compiled a vector of N distances. We defined the surveillance
measurement q2 coefficient, a measurement between 0 and 1, as
the proportion of sequences within genetic distance R of the most
closely related ancestor.
q2
Genetic Distance  R
N
Given a viral evolutionary rate of  substitutions per site per
year, R t  is thus the expected proportion of mutations that
have accumulated over the span of t years. In this report, we ex-
amine short time periods on the order of a decade and do not
expect the true genetic distance to diverge greatly from the Ham-
ming distance. However, we calculate the q2 coefficient by using a
number of distance methods, including Hamming distance,
Jukes-Cantor, Kimura, Tamura, Tajima-Nei, Hasegawa, and Nei-
Tamura, and find little significant change (see Results). If the sur-
veillance of a pathogen in a given time and place is sufficient, we
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would therefore expect a maximal number of viral isolates to have
a closest ancestor in the sequence database with a sequence iden-
tity of greater than 1R. For the q coefficient, we chose to use t
2 years since antigenic variant strains of influenza virus emerge
and become predominant over a period of roughly 2 to 5 years
(23); however, any value of t can be used. One consideration is that
substitution rates can vary over time and across different lineages.
To incorporate such variability into our calculation of the q2 co-
efficient, we used the 95% highest posterior density (HPD) inter-
val of the evolutionary rate collected from the literature (see Ta-
ble S1 in the supplemental material) (24–26).
A major motivation behind use of the q2 coefficient is the abil-
ity to evaluate the surveillance of different strains, hosts, and geo-
graphic regions. Sampling during variable windows of time, how-
ever, can compromise an appropriate comparison. For example, a
high q2 coefficient derived from a local weeklong outbreak should
not be extrapolated to surveillance during an entire season. For any
comparisons of surveillance over a span of years, we therefore exclude
from analysis any groups not sampled for more than a month.
Influenza virus surveillance. Complete coding sequences of
hemagglutinin (HA), the major antigenic segment of influenza
virus, were collected from the NCBI (National Center for Biotech-
nology Information) and GISAID databases and multiply aligned.
To compare the levels of surveillance of different strains, we sep-
arately considered sequences for human (H3N2, seasonal H1N1
pre-2009, SOIV H1N1 post-2009, and H5N1), avian (H5N1 and
non-H5N1), and swine H1N1 influenza viruses. Figure 1A and B
depict the absolute number of sequences isolated across time as a
first measure of surveillance. However, we wanted a measure of
surveillance that would take into account the evolutionary rate of
the virus, as well as the biodiversity of the viral pool. Calculation of
Shannon’s entropy in Fig. 1C is an effective measure of genetic
diversity but, by itself, is no measure of surveillance.
Toward a measure that synthesizes both the absolute number
of isolates and the evolutionary rate, we calculated the q2 coeffi-
cient as a function of time for each influenza virus strain in Fig. 1D
as a representation of surveillance history. We also tabulated their
final q2 coefficients (see Tables S2 and S3 in the supplemental
material) and mapped these values among WHO transmission
zones (27) in Fig. 2 (and Fig. S2 in the supplemental material) to
denote the present state of surveillance around the world. We
showed that our q2 coefficient calculations did not drastically
change for different genetic distances (0.035 difference in the q2
coefficient).
FIG 1 Surveillance of influenza A virus. (A) Numbers of human H3N2 and H1N1 sequences over time. (B) Numbers of H5N1 and swine H1N1pdm sequences
over time. (C) Measurement of influenza A virus genetic diversity by entropy. (D) Measurement of influenza A virus surveillance by the q2 coefficient over time.
The width of each plotted line denotes the interval of q2 based on the 95% HPD of the evolutionary rate. n 7,083 H3N2 human (dark blue), 2,567 H1N1 human
(blue), 11,626 H1N1pdm human (cyan), 878 H1N1 swine (green), 1,193 H5N1 avian (yellow), 158 H5N1 human (orange), and 3,418 non-H5N1 avian (red)
influenza virus sequences.
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Analysis of each strain reflects a different state of geographic
and host surveillance. Overall, surveillance of human seasonal
strains was high; the q2 coefficient values of both human seasonal
H3N2 and seasonal H1N1 viruses, which had been sampled and
sequenced long before 2003, approached 1 from 2003 to the pres-
ent (Fig. 1D). Clustering of sequences by transmission zone began
to uncover weakness in the surveillance of seasonal H3N2, partic-
ularly in central Asia (see Fig. S1A and S2A in the supplemental
material). In addition to central Asia, several parts of Europe,
western Asia, and especially central Africa, yielded lower q2 coef-
ficients of seasonal H1N1 (see Fig. S1B and S2B in the supplemen-
tal material). As a testament to the global response to the pan-
demic, human SOIV H1N1 shot up to a q2 coefficient of 1 shortly
after its arrival in March 2009 in all transmission zones except
central and southern Africa and central Asia
(Fig. 1D; see Fig. S1C and S2C in the supple-
mental material).
In contrast, despite a moderate increase
in the number of sequences following
H1N1pdm’s arrival (Fig. 1B), the q2 coeffi-
cient of classical H1N1 swine isolates has
lagged much further behind (Fig. 1D) and is
consistently high only in the eastern Asian
(q2 coefficient 0.753, Hamming distance)
and North American (q2 coefficient 0.877,
Hamming distance) transmission zones
(Fig. 2A; see Fig. S1D in the supplemental
material). These findings suggest that sur-
veillance of pigs is still not enough to capture
the high biodiversity of swine flu, as indi-
cated by entropy (Fig. 1C).
Analysis of H5N1 influenza virus de-
scribes the effects of implementing interna-
tional sequencing initiatives like GISAID.
Immediately following the second outbreak
of HPAI virus among humans in 2003, the q2
coefficient of H5N1 in both human and
avian hosts rose to approximately 0.7 to 0.85.
With the establishment of GISAID in 2006,
both human and avian H5N1 influenza virus
q2 coefficients increased further to high lev-
els of around 0.9, affirming the effectiveness
of the global consortium. Beyond 2007, how-
ever, the surveillance of human H5N1 influ-
enza virus has waned compared to that of
avian H5N1 influenza virus (Fig. 1D). This
discrepancy is most likely due to the fact that
human HPAI cases represent a subsampling
of avian H5N1 influenza virus genotypes, as
reflected by the slight drop in human H5N1
entropy compared to that in birds (Fig. 1C).
Within H5N1, there is biased sampling in
different transmission zones. Following par-
ticularly large outbreaks, H5N1 human sur-
veillance is high, with q2 coefficients of
roughly 0.9 in northern Africa and eastern
and southeastern Asia. Over time, the q2 co-
efficient has decreased in eastern and south-
eastern Asia most likely because of a decline
in the number of sporadic introductions into
the local human populations compared to that in northern Africa,
specifically Egypt (see Fig. S1E and S2D in the supplemental ma-
terial). H5N1 avian influenza virus surveillance is high in northern
and western Africa; eastern, southeastern, and southern Asia; and
eastern, southwestern, and northern Europe. On the other hand,
the q2 coefficient indicates less avian H5N1 influenza virus sur-
veillance in North America. In the United States, for example, only
until 2006 were the reporting and tracking of H5 in birds man-
dated by the USDA (28). The smaller push for reporting stems
from the low pathogenicity displayed by North American avian
H5N1 influenza virus strains, which have antigenic and genetic
differences from the Asian HPAI virus lineage (see Fig. S1F and
S2E in the supplemental material) (29).
These results indicate that H5N1 influenza virus surveillance of
FIG 2 Global map of influenza A virus surveillance in animal hosts by transmission zones. The
strains depicted include swine H1N1 (A) and non-H5N1 (B) avian influenza virus strains. Each
zone is colored in the blue-to-red spectrum to indicate the q2 coefficient. Gray areas denote regions
with viruses isolated over a span of no more than 1 month.
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avian hosts is much more complete than H1N1 surveillance of
swine. However, potential zoonotic transmission from other
avian strains is possible, as well. Performance of the same analysis
of non-H5N1 avian influenza virus strains yielded a low q2 coef-
ficient beginning at 0.5 in 2003 and plateauing at a level just below
0.7 in spite of GISAID (Fig. 1D) and the resulting increase in
sequenced isolates (Fig. 1B). This finding potentially reflects the
extremely high genetic diversity of influenza A virus in its natural
reservoir (Fig. 1C) that is not fully captured by current surveil-
lance systems. Transmission zone analysis of non-H5N1 avian
influenza virus strains indicates that non-H5N1 surveillance is
concentrated in southwestern Europe, the Central American-
Caribbean region, North America, northern Africa, and eastern
and southeastern Asia (Fig. 2B; see Fig. S1G in the supplemental
material).
Calculation of the q2 coefficient for other complete coding
segments of influenza virus was also performed. Since observed
differences in sequences should reflect the evolutionary rates of
each segment, any differences in the q2 coefficient should reflect
differences in sampling alone. For H3N2, H1N1pdm, and sea-
sonal H1N1, the q2 coefficient exhibited little change among dif-
ferent segments (differences of 0.02) and moderate change for
other strains. The largest change in the q2 coefficient was 0.186
between swine H1N1 HA and PB2. Despite such differences be-
tween segments, results showed that generally surveillance of hu-
man H3N2, H1N1pdm, and seasonal H1N1 across all segments
surpassed that of human H5N1, avian H5N1, swine H1N1, and
non-H5N1 avian influenza viruses (see Tables S2 and S3 in the
supplemental material).
Dengue and West Nile virus surveillance. As a proof of con-
cept, we have also shown that the q2 coefficient can be used to
monitor surveillance efforts for other RNA viruses, such as dengue
virus and West Nile virus. Here, we focus on the env gene of these
viruses, as it encodes the longest of the structural proteins, which
is prevalently sequenced for subtyping and has the best-
documented evolutionary rates of all flavivirus proteins (25, 26,
30, 31).
Calculation of the q2 coefficients of dengue virus subtypes 1, 2,
and 3 depicts poor surveillance in general (Fig. 3; see Fig. S3 and
Table S4 in the supplemental material). These sampling gaps may
reflect the current limited funding and staff in many tropical
countries around the world (32). The incorporation of other ge-
netic distances besides Hamming distance produced a 0.118
change in the q2 coefficient of dengue virus.
The q2 coefficient of West Nile virus in the United States, on
the other hand, was higher in the first few years after its introduc-
tion into the United States (see Fig. S4 and Table S5 in the supple-
mental material). However, despite the implementation of early
warning systems for West Nile virus, by sampling dead birds (33)
and mosquito populations (34), the q2 coefficient beyond 2003
dropped over time, even with the addition of multiple isolates
within a short period of time. This decline in the q2 coefficient
coincided with a rapid population growth of West Nile virus in the
United States during 2002 and 2003 spurred by the establishment
of the WN02 strain marked by a V159A mutation in its E protein
(35). This analysis suggests that current surveillance is being out-
paced by the growing diversity of the virus in the New World.
Other genetic distances besides the Hamming distance produced a
0.094 change in the q2 coefficient of West Nile virus.
Comparison to phylogenetic methods. One may wonder if
other alternative methods that account for pathogen evolution
may suffice to characterize the genetic surveillance of a pathogen.
Phylogenetics has been used in many studies to characterize
pathogen surveillance qualitatively without producing a quantita-
tive measure of sampling completeness (36). A possible phyloge-
netic analogue to the q2 coefficient might entail the reconstruction
of a tree based on available sequences and measurement of the
distribution of branch lengths. The true distance between two
isolates, A and B, is represented by the sum of their patristic dis-
tances, dA and dB, which are the branch lengths from each respec-
tive sequence to their common ancestral node. Sequences are time
ordered, however, and if we assume an approximate molecular
clock, then dA dB given that sequence A occurs before sequence
B. An estimate of distance is then the larger patristic distance. A
parallel to our q2 coefficient would predict high surveillance to
correspond to a maximal number (#) of patristic distances d to
their closest ancestor in the past less than 2 years as follows:
p2
# branch lengths d 2 years
Total # branch lengths d
Moreover, homogeneity of surveillance can be confirmed if
branch lengths d have low variance.
Phylogenies can be divided into those that are distance based
and those that are character based. Since the q2 coefficient readily
incorporates different genetic distance methods, it is equivalent to
any p2 coefficient calculated from distance-based trees. On the
other hand, character-based trees, including maximum-
likelihood and Bayesian inference methods, incorporate site het-
erogeneity by considering one character (a site in the alignment)
at a time to reconstruct a tree (37); moreover, Markov chain
Monte Carlo (MCMC) methods like BEAST (38) can incorporate
relaxed clock rates. The q2 coefficient does not take into account
either site or clock rate heterogeneity.
To determine the impact of site and clock rate heterogeneity in
quantifying surveillance completeness, we calculated the p2 coef-
ficient of the human H5N1 HA data set of 158 sequences by using
BEAST (see Materials and Methods). We accounted for site het-
erogeneity by using the gamma model (39) and reconstructed
trees under both strict and relaxed molecular clocks. We calcu-
lated the p2 coefficients to be 0.848 (0.740 to 0.917) and 0.860
(0.721 to 0.911) for the strict and relaxed clocks, respectively.
Given our q2 coefficient of 0.821 (0.795 to 0.848) for human
H5N1 HA, we concluded that incorporating site heterogeneity
and a relaxed molecular clock did not make a significant differ-
ence.
While these phylogenetic techniques can examine the fit of a
number of evolutionary models, they suffer from problems of
robustness. For example, tree topology can be highly unstable; the
addition or deletion of a single sequence can radically restructure
the tree. Moreover, different methods of phylogenetic inference,
such as maximum likelihood or Bayesian inference, can lead to
variable results, rendering interpretation of surveillance compli-
cated. Finally, computation time, particularly for BEAST, can be
very expensive; for data sets of more than 1,000 sequences, several
weeks may be needed for the MCMC to converge to a stable tree
solution. In our analysis of 158 human H5N1 HA sequences, p2
coefficients needed days of computation to complete, whereas q2
coefficient analysis was finished in a matter of seconds.
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Comparison to clusteringmethods.Another possible surveil-
lance measurement characterizes the cluster structure of isolates.
In an ideal situation, a well-sampled population of sequences sep-
arated by genetic distance would be represented by points densely
and homogeneously spread across a continuum. Therefore, clus-
tering techniques such as hierarchical, k-means, or expectation-
maximization clustering can be used to ascertain how poorly sam-
pled a pathogen is on the basis of the number of clusters in a data
set. Bar coding is an alternative strategy based on the field of per-
sistent homology that identifies topologically
invariant clusters in cloud data; in particular,
it calculates the b0 Betti number, the number
of connected components in a set of simpli-
cial complexes constructed from sequences
at different filtration Hamming distances
(see Materials and Methods) (40). A lower b0
would indicate better sampling.
As a comparison to the q2 coefficient, we
applied bar coding to determine the b0 values
of different influenza virus strains at filtra-
tion Hamming distances  ranging from 0 to
200 (Fig. 4A). This threshold  is analogous
to the R threshold of the q2 coefficient:
2 years of influenza virus evolution equiva-
lent to 2 (5 103) 1% genetic distance.
We therefore considered b0 at a Hamming
distance of 1% of the length of HA, or
roughly 17 nucleotides, to be appropriate for
comparison to the q2 coefficient (Fig. 4B).
For the most part, the q2 coefficient and b0
are inversely correlated. For example, the low
b0 and high q2 coefficient of human H3N2,
seasonal H1N1, and H1N1pdm indicate
good surveillance. Non-H5N1 avian influ-
enza virus has an extremely high b0 and a low
q2 coefficient. It should be noted that the
non-H5N1 avian influenza virus data set
contains 15 different HA subtypes, as op-
posed to all of the other single-subtype HA
data sets considered. Thus, b0 may need to be
normalized by the expected number of HA
subtypes. Nevertheless, b0 for non-H5N1
avian influenza virus remains high even with
normalization. However, as with p2, calcula-
tion of b0 demands substantial computing
power and time on the order of hours.
Comparison to diversity metrics. Other
alternative methods of gauging sampling bias
may exist. For instance, there are many di-
versity metrics in ecology, including Chao’s
estimate of asymptotic species richness (41),
and in information theory, techniques like
Shannon’s entropy, which was applied in
Fig. 1C. In particular, it is well known that the
empirical Shannon entropy of a sample un-
derestimates the entropy of the true distribu-
tion. Bootstrapping techniques can be used
to estimate the bias produced by a low num-
ber of sequences. This method is attractive
for its ability to measure surveillance by as-
saying the diversity of a pathogen directly. However, like the phy-
logenetic and bar coding methods considered, implementation
for a large number of trials is substantially more difficult, compu-
tationally expensive, and time-consuming.
DISCUSSION
In this paper, we offer a quantitative method of measuring the
quality of surveillance of a particular pathogen that reflects its
evolutionary rate and genetic diversity. The q2 coefficient repre-
FIG 3 Global map of dengue virus (DENV) surveillance in different countries. The strains de-
picted include DENV-1 (A), DENV-2 (B), and DENV-3 (C). Each zone is colored in the blue-to-red
spectrum to indicate the q2 coefficient. Gray areas denote regions with viruses isolated over a span
of no more than 1 month.
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sents an easily interpretable quantitative measure of genomic sur-
veillance that does not rely on a full phylogenetic reconstruction.
A number between 0 and 1, the q2 coefficient reflects the fraction
of isolates with a closest isolate in the past within 2 years of evolu-
tion. However, in its simplicity, the q2 coefficient does not capture
the complexity of evolutionary processes such as variable evolu-
tionary rates, recombination, reassortment, and population ge-
netic effects. We decided on the q2 coefficient instead of other
equally valid metrics (Q1, q5, or q100) because 2 years represents
the median influenza A virus vaccine update time. However, dif-
ferent metrics may be applicable, depending on the specific aim of
the surveillance program.
We applied this measure to multiple influenza virus strains and
found that current surveillance is generally complete for humans,
particularly H1N1pdm, H3N2, and seasonal H1N1, but poor for
other hosts, particularly swine. Indeed, the calculated q2 coeffi-
cient of swine H1N1 is most likely an overestimate, considering
that influenza virus evolves more slowly in swine than in humans
because of a lesser degree of immune selection (42). This finding
reaffirms the need for increased surveillance of swine, which can
serve as mixing vessels for pandemic strain selection.
Compared to human H3N2 and H1N1 surveillance, human
and avian H5N1 influenza virus surveillance is lower at q2 coeffi-
cients of 0.838 and 0.923, respectively. Although these the q2 co-
efficients are already high, the difference in the q2 coefficient may
suggest that there are strains of H5N1 circulating in bird and even
possibly human hosts that remain undetected. Given the recent
discovery of molecular determinants that enable ferret-to-ferret
transmission of H5N1 virus (10), it is all the more important to
increase viral isolation to match or exceed the levels of human
H3N2 and H1N1 surveillance.
In our analysis, we also noted geographic disparities; a prepon-
derance of H5N1 avian influenza virus isolates derived from
northern and western Africa; eastern, southeastern, and southern
FIG 4 Persistence homology analysis of influenza virus. (A) Bar coding plots of b0 for each strain of influenza virus. b0, or the number of simplicial complexes,
can be determined by counting the bars present at each filtration Hamming distance. A lower b0 value indicates better surveillance, although this number may
be higher in a setting of bottleneck effects. (B) Comparison of persistence homology and the q2 coefficient applied to influenza virus. The top bar plot displays
b0 at a Hamming distance of 17, roughly 1% of the length of HA. The bottom bar plot displays q2 coefficients, with a threshold of 2 years of influenza virus
evolution, or 2 (5 103) 1%.
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Asia; and eastern, southwestern, and northern Europe. Although
North America’s surveillance of non-H5N1 avian influenza vi-
rus sequences is trending upward, it is particularly deficient in
the sampling of H5N1 avian influenza virus. Even though only
low-pathogenicity avian influenza virus has been discovered in
North America, it is clear that current surveillance is not suffi-
cient to capture the complete diversity of even this H5N1 pop-
ulation.
One may wonder whether factors beyond the completeness of
surveillance, such as natural selection, may influence the q2 coef-
ficient. For instance, bottlenecks and selective sweeps can reduce
the diversity of a pathogen population, thus increasing the q2 co-
efficient. However, it is important to note that in such cases, the q2
coefficient behaves appropriately, for it simply reflects surveil-
lance completeness. If only a few sequences are enough to capture
the reduced biodiversity following a bottleneck, the q2 coefficient
will be close to 1.
Another possible confounding effect stems from selection bias
in the submission of sequences to public databases. We account
for any possible duplication of sequences by considering only
unique sequences from each date and location. Beyond this safe-
guard, we acknowledge that the q2 coefficient may fall prey to
selection bias. However, without prior knowledge of such biases, it
would be difficult for any method to address these confounders
satisfactorily.
We compared the q2 coefficient to other possible quantita-
tive methods, including those based on phylogenetics and clus-
tering. A drawback common to many of these surveillance
methods is that they are slow, computationally expensive tech-
niques that are not explicitly designed to capture pathogen
diversity. For this reason, we developed the q2 coefficient,
which is readily computable and captures surveillance at any
given time point. Applying the q2 coefficient revealed deficient
sampling of swine H1N1 and nonavian H5N1, dengue, and
West Nile viruses. These results bear great potential to guide
the future allocation of energy and resources for gathering viral
isolates. We also foresee further ecological applications of the
q2 coefficient as an effective measure of asymptotic species
richness without relying on arbitrary criteria for defining spe-
cies, unlike classic techniques like Chao’s estimate. This feature
can be particularly valuable for assessing the number of addi-
tional samples needed to represent all of the species of an or-
ganism in metagenomic studies. In conclusion, the scientific
community as a whole must improve its surveillance networks
and share information for the advancement of scientific in-
quiry and public health interventions, and we offer the q2 co-
efficient as a means of evaluating the effectiveness of such ef-
forts.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Sequence collection, annotation, and alignment. Complete coding se-
quences of all influenza virus coding segments were collected from the
NCBI influenza virus resource (43) and the GISAID database (20) down-
loaded as of October 2012 for human, avian, and swine hosts. Complete
coding sequences for the envelope (env) gene of dengue virus subtypes 1,
2, and 3, as well as West Nile virus, were collected from the Virus Pathogen
Resource and Broad Institute downloaded as of May 2012. All sequences
were filtered for year and month information. If no day information was
provided, isolation was assumed to have occurred on the 15th of the
month. To avoid the effect of depositing duplicated sequences, only
unique sequences were considered for each date and location. Sequences
were then aligned using ClustalW2 v. 2.0.12, using default parameters,
and then manually curated. Influenza virus sequences were annotated by
transmission zones, defined by the WHO as geographically contiguous
regions with similar peaks in the influenza season (27). All alignments and
the code used are available upon request.
Shannon’s entropy as ameasurement of genetic diversity.Our mea-
surement of pathogen surveillance incorporates the evolutionary rate,
which contributes to population diversity. To measure genetic diversity
directly, we chose to employ Shannon’s entropy, a popular and intuitive
measure that avoids cumbersome phylogenetic reconstruction, and ap-
plied it to the distribution of alleles at each nucleotide position within an
alignment. This calculation recovers the number of bits of information
per base. Assuming the independence of each position, the total entropy
of a population is the sum of the entropies of each base position of the
alignment. To correct for bias stemming from a variable number of iso-
lates (n), we estimate Shannon’s entropy (H) for a given base position on









Phylogeny as a measurement of surveillance. Sequences were ana-
lyzed by using BEAST v1.7.4, a Bayesian MCMC approach, to sample
time-structured evolutionary trees from their joint posterior probability
distribution. Because of computational and time limits, we restricted our
phylogenetic analysis to human H5N1, as BEAST analysis of data sets of
over a thousand sequences can take weeks to converge to a stationary
condition. This data set was analyzed by using an exponential-growth
coalescent as a tree prior with an HKYmodel of nucleotide substitu-
tion. Relaxed and strict molecular clocks were employed. For the strict
(relaxed) clock, 20 independent runs of 750,000 (1,500,000) steps each
were performed, compared for convergence, and combined, with a
burn-in of 150,000 (500,000) steps from each. Each run finished after an
average of 32.47 (19.14) h using one 3.00-GHz Intel Xeon CPU with 12 GB
of random-access memory. A single maximum clade credibility (MCC)
tree was created from each set of simulations with the average length
determined for each branch. We found the corresponding evolutionary
rates to be 5.11 103 (range, 4.58 103 to 5.62 103) and 5.39
103 (range 4.39 103 to 5.80 103), similar to the evolutionary rate
we used for influenza virus HA analysis. The 95% HPD of each branch
length of the MCC tree was used to set a confidence interval for each p2
coefficient.
Persistence homology as a measurement of surveillance. Another
possible surveillance measure can be derived by using persistence homol-
ogy techniques like bar coding (40), a method of identifying topological
invariants in cloud data. First, sequenced isolates can be transformed in
high-dimensional space by using distance measures, such as pairwise ge-
netic distance. From these cloud data, points can be linked together on the
basis of certain criteria to form a simplicial complex, i.e., a network of
points, line segments, triangles, and even n-dimensional counterparts.
When this criterion is a distance less than some , a filtered simplicial
complex or Vietoris-Rips stream is created.
An objective in the study of topology is to identify features of filtered
simplicial complexes that persist across all values of . A useful character-
istic is the Betti number, which in dimension 0 is b0, the number of con-
nected components in a particular simplicial complex. Trivially, with a
large enough , b0 is 1, but what is interesting is the minimum value of 
that yields a b0 value of 1. Low values would indicate a higher degree of
surveillance.
The calculation of Vietoris-Rips streams for large point cloud data can
be computationally expensive, and an alternative method called witness
streams (45) can be used to estimate . Suppose a landmark subset of
points (L) is preselected from point cloud data either at random or using
a max-min scheme. Let d(L, p) be a vector of distances between a point p
and all points in L. In dimension 0, a pair of points is then linked if there
Chan and Rabadan
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exists a witness point z such that the maximum d(L, p) is less than the sum
of  and the minimum d(L, p).
Using the Javaplex software package at http://code.google.com/p
/javaplex, we implemented a witness stream to filter different strains of
influenza virus. Of N total sequences per strain, n sequences were chosen
as landmarks by using the max-min selection algorithm, such that N/n
3 (45). Bar coding was performed at filtration Hamming distances  at
intervals of 20 from 0 to 100.
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